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Abstract
One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual co-
operation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod’s
tournaments of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demon-
strated the role of reciprocity in the emergence of cooperation. However, the
stability of TFT does not hold in the presence of implementation error, and a
TFT population is prone to neutral drift to unconditional cooperation, which
eventually invites defectors. We argue that a combination of TFT and anti-
TFT (ATFT) overcomes these difficulties in a noisy environment, provided
that ATFT is defined as choosing the opposite to the opponent’s last move.
According to this TFT-ATFT strategy, a player normally uses TFT; turns
to ATFT upon recognizing his or her own error; returns to TFT either when
mutual cooperation is recovered or when the opponent unilaterally defects
twice in a row. The proposed strategy provides simple and deterministic
behavioral rules for correcting implementation error in a way that cannot be
exploited by the opponent, and suppresses the neutral drift to unconditional
cooperation.
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1. Introduction
Game theory has provided useful frameworks to understand conflict and
cooperation in the absence of a central authority. In many studies, reci-
procity is a particularly important idea to explain cooperation between ra-
tional players. In the iterated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game,
the repetition makes it profitable for each player to cooperate because one
has to take the other’s reaction into account [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. As long as both
are sufficiently patient and free from error, therefore, the players cooperate
from the first encounter and this continues forever. The notion of reciprocity
has been popularized by the success of Tit-for-Tat (TFT) in Axelrod’s tour-
naments [7]. TFT cooperates at the first encounter with the co-player, and
replicates the co-player’s previous move in the subsequent rounds. Axelrod
has argued that this simple strategy is nice, retaliating, forgiving, and non-
envious. However, the situation becomes much more complicated in a noisy
environment, where it is possible to make an implementation error: For ex-
ample, there can be an inefficient alternation of cooperation and defection
between two TFT players when one of them makes a mistake [8, 9]. Tit-for-
Two-Tats (TF2T) is more tolerant, because it retaliates when the co-player
defects twice in a row. Although TF2T was proposed as a remedy to avoid
the inefficiency of TFT, its predictability opens another possibility of be-
ing exploited. Generous TFT avoids this dilemma between generosity and
exploitability by introducing randomness in forgiving the co-player’s defec-
tion [10, 11, 12, 13]. However, its unpredictability might be a double-edged
sword when it comes to public policy making, in which such random factors
are not popular ideas [14]. Moreover, Generous TFT is overwhelmed by a
more generous strategy called Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS), also known as
Pavlov [15], in the evolution of cooperation [16]. WSLS is one of aspiration-
based strategies [17, 18], which means that it attempts changes when its
payoff becomes less than a certain level. For example, when WSLS is in mu-
tual defection with its co-player, it receives a lower payoff than the aspiration
level and thus cooperates next time. The success of WSLS originates from
the ability to correct error quickly when played against another WSLS player.
The price is that WSLS easily falls into a victim of an unconditional defector
(AllD). All these difficulties are rooted in the error vulnerability of TFT.
Worse is that this is not the only weakness: A TFT population is invaded
via neutral drift by unconditional cooperators (AllC), which, in turn, opens
the back door to AllD [11, 12, 13, 19]. It would thus be desirable if some
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modification overcame these shortcomings while preserving the strengths of
TFT. This work will show that such a combination is actually possible.
A method of searching for successful cooperating strategies is to perform
an evolutionary experiment in silico [16, 20, 21]. The purpose of such an
experiment is to simulate natural selection. The experimenter does not have
direct control over selection, but only determines evolutionary dynamics and
an accessible set of strategies. If this can be called a bottom-up approach,
it is also possible to think of a top-down approach; we can impose certain
criteria that a successful strategy is expected to satisfy and sort out strategies
that meet the criteria. This work follows the latter approach. One of its
advantages is that it does not need pairwise comparisons between all the
strategies under consideration so that the computational cost scales only
linearly with the number of strategies. We do not mean that this approach
will find an optimal strategy such that guarantees maximal payoffs. Nor do
we mean that it will be equivalent to the result of evolutionary experiments or
actual human behavior. Rather, our purpose is to design a workable solution
to avoid a series of wasting retaliation from a mistaken move, when players
are bound to interact repeatedly.
Our finding is that the top-down approach singles out a strategy that
combines TFT and anti-TFT (ATFT) in a way that it stabilizes mutual
cooperation in the presence of implementation error. Note that ATFT does
the opposite to the co-player’s last move. According to this proposed strategy,
our focal player Alice normally uses TFT but switches to ATFT when she
recognizes her own error. Alice returns back to TFT either when mutual
cooperation is recovered or when Bob unilaterally defects twice in a row.
The strategy says that Alice is responsible only for her own error without
any need to judge Bob’s behavior. Our result provides a simple deterministic
error-correcting rule, which is secured against repeated exploitation at the
same time.
Before proceeding to the next section, let us assume that the players in
this work perceive their respective payoffs with no uncertainty as defined by
the game, although they do make implementation errors. In other words,
their history of moves is given as public information, whose accessibility is
limited only by their memory spans. Moreover, we set aside other public
information such as social standing, which is required in Contrite TFT [22,
23, 24, 25] as well as in some form of indirect reciprocity [26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
31, 32]. After deriving our main results under these assumptions, we will
revisit the problem of perception error.
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2. Method and Result
The payoff matrix M of the PD game can be written as follows:

 C DC MCC MCD
D MDC MDD

 , (1)
where C and D denote each player’s possible moves, cooperation and de-
fection, respectively. The matrix elements satisfy two inequalities: First,
MDC > MCC > MDD > MCD for mutual defection to be a Nash equilib-
rium. Second, MCC > (MCD +MDC)/2 for mutual cooperation to be Pareto
optimal.
In the IPD, we define a state as a history of moves chosen by two players
Alice and Bob for the past m time steps. The number of states is n = 22m,
because each of the two players has m binary choices between C and D.
Choosing m = 2, for example, we work with n = 16 states, each of which at
time t can be written as St = (At−2At−1, Bt−2Bt−1) = (Alice’s moves at t− 2
and t− 1, Bob’s moves at t− 2 and t− 1). Alice’s strategy is represented as
a mapping from the state St to her move At ∈ {C,D} at an arbitrary time
step t. The total number of Alice’s possible strategies is thus N = 2n = 22
2m
.
Here, we do not specify initial moves for t ≤ m in defining a strategy, because
they are irrelevant when we consider long-term averages in the presence of
error, as will be explained below.
It is instructive to note that the state at time t + 1 is written as St+1 =
(At−1At, Bt−1Bt), which always shares At−1 andBt−1 with St = (At−2At−1, Bt−2Bt−1).
In addition, At is determined from St by our focal player Alice’s strat-
egy. For this reason, when Alice’s strategy and state St are given, the
only unknown part is Bt ∈ {C,D}. We impose no restriction on Bob’s
strategy, so each state can generally be followed by one of two different
states at the next time step. For example, suppose that Alice finds her-
self in St = (At−2At−1, Bt−2Bt−1) = (CD,CC) at time t and her strategy
prescribes At = D for this St. Then, we conclude that her next state
St+1 = (At−1At, Bt−1Bt) must be either (DD,CC) or (DD,CD). Graph-
ically, this idea can be represented as depicted in Fig. 1.
Suppose a sequence of moves in the IPD between two strategies i and j.
Let F
(t)
ij ∈ {MCC ,MCD,MDC ,MDD} denote the payoff of strategy i against
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DD,CC
DD,CD
CD,CC
Figure 1: Possible transitions from state St = (At−2At−1, Bt−2Bt−1) = (CD,CC) to
St+1 = (At−1At, Bt−1Bt), which can be either (DD,CC) or (DD,CD) when Alice’s
strategy prescribes At = D for that St.
j at time step t. We are interested in its long-term average, i.e.,
Fij(T ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
F
(t)
ij (2)
with T ≫ 1. If both i and j have finite memories, the calculation of Fij(T →
∞) can be simplified as follows: Any pair of strategies with finite memories
constitute a Markov process described by a stochastic matrix. When error is
absent, the moves of two deterministic strategies eventually form a loop. By
a loop, we mean a sequence of consecutive states St → St+1 → . . . → St+ν
allowed by the strategies, in which St+ν = St with a positive integer ν.
The integer ν is called the length of the loop. If the number of possible
loops is greater than one, which loop the players will be trapped in will
be determined by an initial state, which corresponds to their first moves.
However, when implementation error occurs with probability e ≪ 1 so that
intended cooperation or defection can fail, they can escape from the loop with
a time scale of O(1/e). The probabilities assigned to states thus converge
to a unique stationary distribution in the long run, regardless of the initial
state [33, 34]. For example, when AllC meets TFT, the interaction can be
described by the following n× n stochastic matrix U with n = 22m = 4:
j = (C,C) (C,D) (D,C) (D,D)
i =
(C,C)
(C,D)
(D,C)
(D,D)


(1− e)2 (1− e)2 (1− e)e (1− e)e
(1− e)e (1− e)e (1− e)2 (1− e)2
e(1− e) e(1− e) e2 e2
e2 e2 e(1− e) e(1 − e)

 , (3)
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where its element Uij is the probability to observe state i given the pre-
vious state j. We calculate the stationary distribution over n states from
the principal eigenvector ~v satisfying U~v = ~v. For notational convenience,
we simply identify ~v with the stationary distribution, assuming that it is
normalized as a probability distribution. Let fij denote the inner product
between ~v and ~m ≡ (MCC ,MCD,MDC ,MDD) with i=AllC and j=TFT. The
Perron-Frobenius theorem tells us that Fij(T ) converges to fij as T → ∞.
Generalization to other strategies is straightforward.
We require that a successful strategy k should satisfy the following crite-
ria:
1. Efficiency: It must achieve mutual cooperation if the co-player employs
the same strategy. It means that fkk should approach MCC as e→ 0.
2. Distinguishability: It must be able to exploit AllC to avoid the neutral
drift. To be more precise, when j=AllC, the payoff difference fkj − fjk
should remain positive finite as e→ 0.
3. Defensibility: It must not be exploited repeatedly by the co-player.
In other words, for strategy k to be defensible, it should satisfy the
following inequality:
ν−1∑
τ=0
[
F
(t+τ)
kj − F
(t+τ)
jk
]
≥ 0
against any finite-memory strategy j, where the payoffs are evaluated
along every possible loop St → St+1 → . . .→ St+ν allowed by k and j.
Let us explain those criteria in more detail. The first and second criteria
are relatively easy to check, because we only have to match each of the
N = 22
2m
strategies against itself and AllC, respectively. For each of such
pairs, we carry out the linear-algebraic calculation of the principal eigenvector
as in Eq. (3) to obtain the stationary distribution ~v. By looking at which
states occupy the most probabilities as e→ 0, we can tell whether each given
strategy meets the criteria.
As for the defensibility criterion, let us begin by assuming that both Alice
and Bob use deterministic strategies with memory length m. As mentioned
above, the players can be trapped in a loop for a period of O(1/e)≫ 1. If the
loop gives a lower payoff to Alice than to Bob in one cycle, we say that she
is exposed to the risk of repeated exploitation. The defensibility criterion
means that the player’s strategy should not allow such a risky loop. For
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example, TF2T is not defensible, because it can be trapped in the following
sequence of moves when it meets WSLS:
TF2T CCDD CCDD · · ·
WSLS DDDC DDDC · · · ,
which is clearly disadvantageous to TF2T at every repetition. In fact, the
defensibility criterion does not restrict the co-player’s strategy to determin-
istic ones. Now suppose that Bob has adopted a stochastic strategy with
memory length m. For every possible loop with nonzero probability, we can
find a deterministic memory-m strategy for Bob to reproduce the loop. For
this reason, if a given strategy does not contain risky loops against any deter-
ministic memory-m strategy, it is also unexploitable by stochastic memory-m
strategies. Even if Bob uses a longer memory than m, Alice can marginalize
his strategy to reconstruct an effective stochastic one with memory length m.
The conclusion is the following: If a given strategy has no risky loops against
an arbitrary deterministic memory-m strategy, it is a sufficient condition for
defensibility. Therefore, for each strategy that pass the efficiency and distin-
guishability criteria, we examine all its loops by matching it against N = 22
2m
deterministic strategies one by one with probing every possible initial state.
The computational cost is bigger than those of the other two criteria. Still,
it is far less than N2 needed for direct pairwise comparison, because only a
small number of strategies pass the efficiency and distinguishability criteria.
In practice, it is convenient to break up the defensibility test into two parts:
We first check if a given strategy leads to mutual defection against AllD. If
it does, we then proceed to check all its loops.
It turns out that no strategy with m ≤ 1 satisfies these criteria together.
We thus proceed to m = 2 to consider N = 216 strategies. Then, our numer-
ical calculation shows that the joint application of all these criteria singles
out only four strategies, which are identical except for moves at (CD,CD)
and (DC,DC).
To resolve this four-fold degeneracy, we have to consider a stronger form
of the efficiency criterion: For this criterion to hold true in general, mu-
tual cooperation should be restored even if the players, adopting the same
successful strategy, go from (CC,CC) to (CD,CD) via simultaneous mis-
takes with probability e2. This argument determines the moves at (CD,CD)
and (DC,DC) as follows: Suppose that both the players choose D at St =
(CD,CD). It results in mutual defection (DD,DD) and one must keep de-
fecting at (DD,DD) to be defensible against AllD. In short, defection at
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(CD,CD) is not the correct choice to recover cooperation. It is therefore
clear that the successful strategy must prescribe C at St = (CD,CD), which
leads to St+1 = (DC,DC). Once again, unless the players choose C here,
they will take the following undesired path:
(CC,CC)→ [(CD,CD)→ (DC,DC)]→ [(CD,CD)→ (DC,DC)]→ . . . ,
where the square brackets denote a repeating loop of length two. To sum up,
C is the correct choice both at (CD,CD) and (DC,DC), and the recovery
path from simultaneous mistakes goes as follows:
(CC,CC)→ (CD,CD)→ (DC,DC)→ (CC,CC).
Now, we have fully determined the move at every possible state. The result-
ing strategy is tabulated in Table 1. Surprisingly, it can be understood as a
simple combination of TFT and ATFT. Let us therefore call it TFT-ATFT
and explain the reason in the next section.
Table 1: List of moves in TFT-ATFT. This table shows the proposed moves at time t
when the state is given as (At−2At−1, Bt−2Bt−1), where At−2 and At−1 (Bt−2 and Bt−1)
are the focal player’s (the other player’s) moves at the last two steps, respectively. The
underlined moves are the same as prescribed by TFT. The states with the dagger symbol
are related to the two players’ simultaneous mistakes (see text).
state move state move
(CC,CC) C (DC,CC) C
(CC,CD) D (DC,CD) D
(CC,DC) C (DC,DC)† C
(CC,DD) D (DC,DD) C
(CD,CC) D (DD,CC) D
(CD,CD)† C (DD,CD) C
(CD,DC) C (DD,DC) C
(CD,DD) D (DD,DD) D
3. How TFT-ATFT stabilizes cooperation
We have seen that a player’s history of the IPD can be understood as
a series of transitions in a space of n = 22m states. If Alice has mem-
ory length m = 2, her strategy has prescribed her move At at state St =
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(At−2, At−1, Bt−2, Bt−1), by which it puts a restriction on possibilities of the
next state St+1 = (At−1At, Bt−1Bt) as illustrated in Fig. 1. It is convenient
to visualize a strategy as a transition graph [26] by collecting all the possible
transitions between states. Suppose that Alice is using TFT-ATFT against
Bob. Figure 2 represents her strategy as a transition graph, in which each
node corresponds to a state St. Recall that each state can be followed by
two different states depending on Bob’s move Bt ∈ {C,D}. For this reason,
every node in this graph has outgoing links to two different nodes. We stress
that the resulting graph specifies all the possible transitions allowed by Alice,
regardless of Bob’s strategy.
For any transition graph, we can classify the nodes into recurrent and
transient ones [35]: Bob can visit any of recurrent nodes repeatedly by choos-
ing C and D in an appropriate order. For example, (CC,CD) is recurrent
for Alice’s strategy in Table 1 and Fig. 2. It means that Bob, starting from
(CC,CD), can return to it by choosing C, C, and D in sequence, generating
the following path:
(CC,CD)→ (CD,DC)→ (DC,CC)→ (CC,CD).
On the other hand, transient nodes can be visited again only when Alice
deviates from her strategy. An example is (CD,CC), which has no incoming
links in Fig. 2.
Now, let us look into the three criteria from a different perspective than in
the previous section. First of all, if we wish to enforce a certain relationship
between Alice’s and Bob’s payoffs, as required by the defensibility criterion,
we have to consider zero-determinant (ZD) strategies [36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41].
In the Appendix, we argue that TFT is indeed the only deterministic case
of the generous ZD strategies, which guarantees equal payoffs for both the
players. For this reason, the defensibility criterion essentially requires that
Alice should normally use TFT, which does not allow repeated exploitation
no matter what Bob does. Based on this observation, we enumerate accessible
states from (CC,CC) under the assumption that Alice is using TFT:
(CC,CC)→


(CC,CC)
(CC,CD)→


(CD,DC)→
{
(DC,CC)→ . . .
(DC,CD)→ . . .
(CD,DD)→
{
(DD,DC)→ . . .
(DD,DD)→ . . . .
(4)
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CC,CC CC,CD
CD,DC CD,DD
DC,CC DC,CD
DD,CC
DD,DC DD,DD
CC,DC
CC,DD
CD,CC
CD,CD
DC,DC
DC,DD
DD,CD
Figure 2: Visualization of the proposed strategy, TFT-ATFT. We represent each state as
a node and connect possible transitions between them. For example, (CD,CC) in the top-
left corner is connected to (DD,CC) and (DD,CD), because TFT-ATFT prescribes D
at St = (CD,CC) so that the next state should be either St+1 = (DD,CC) or (DD,CD)
depending on the co-player’s move. The nodes drawn in thick black lines are recurrent
and the others are transient. The square cluster of eight recurrent nodes constitutes the
pure TFT to meet the defensibility criterion, and the other recurrent node at the top,
(DD,CC), guarantees the distinguishability criterion by exploiting AllC. The red dotted
lines indicate how a player’s implementation error is corrected when both the players use
this strategy. The blue dashed lines show another path to recover cooperation when both
defect by mistake. The efficiency criterion is fulfilled by these two error-correcting paths.
Note that they make use of transient nodes, so that the co-player cannot activate the
error-correcting paths at will.
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One can readily check that this sequence is eventually closed with visiting
eight different states, which are underlined in Table 1. The use of TFT as
the default mode thereby determines moves at the eight different states. All
these states are recurrent.
However, pure TFT does not meet the efficiency criterion, and we need
to accommodate it in the following way: If Alice made a mistake last time,
she should go to ‘Plan B’ to correct it, which will work under the assumption
that Bob has adopted the same strategy. At the same time, this process must
be secured against Bob’s exploitation, because Bob may well become nasty
to Alice. These two requirements appear to be contradictory to each other.
Our point is that the security is ensured by making use of transient nodes,
which are out of Bob’s control. More specifically, the most probable scenario
in Plan B is that Alice visits (CD,CC) by mistake with probability e≪ 1.
Let us suppose that Bob uses the same strategy and thus normally behaves
as a TFT strategist as shown above. Alice will choose D at (CD,CC) for
the following reason: If she did not, the next state would be (DC,CD), one
of the recurrent states for which Alice’s move is prescribed by the TFT part
[Eq. (4)]. According to the prescription, however, they end up with a series
of TFT retaliation which Alice wants to avoid:
(CD,CC)→ (DC,CD)→ (CD,DC)→ (DC,CD)→ . . . . (wrong).
This is the reason that Alice’s mistake must be followed by another D. In
general, we can construct a decision tree, which starts from (CD,CC) and
branches off depending on Alice’s choice, while Bob’s moves are prescribed by
TFT. By pruning away ‘wrong’ branches leading to inefficiency, we determine
Alice’s correct moves. The result is as follows:
(CD,CC) → (DC,CD)→ (CD,DC)→ . . . : TFT retaliation (wrong)
↓
(DD,CD) → (DD,DD)→ (DD,DD)→ . . . : mutual defection (wrong)
↓
(DC,DD) → (CD,DC)→ (DC,CD)→ . . . : TFT retaliation (wrong)
↓
(CC,DC) → (CD,CC) : back to the starting point (wrong)
↓
(CC,CC). (5)
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The underlined states thus describe the correct path to recover mutual co-
operation in the first scenario of Plan B. It is identical to the red path in
Fig. 2.
There also exists another scenario that both Alice and Bob mistakenly
choose D with probability e2. The starting point will be (CD,CD) this time,
and the previous section has already shown that mutual cooperation should
be recovered int the following way:
(CD,CD) → (DD,DD)→ (DD,DD)→ . . . : mutual defection (wrong)
↓
(DC,DC) → (CD,CD) : back to the starting point (wrong)
↓
(CC,CC), (6)
provided that Alice and Bob have adopted the same strategy. This corre-
sponds to the blue path in Fig. 2, and completes the second scenario of Plan
B. In total, the efficiency criterion determines moves at six different states,
underlined in Eqs. (5) and (6).
We point out that Alice has chosen the opposite to Bob’s previous move
every time until reaching mutual cooperation at (CC,DC) in Eq. (5) or
(DC,DC) in Eq. (6). In other words, the strategy means the following: Play
TFT, but turn to ATFT if you made a mistake last time, and return back to
TFT when mutual cooperation is recovered. This interpretation is actually
consistent with the use of m = 2, because your memory should be as long
as two time steps at least, to tell if you made a mistake last time. That
is, to make a decision between TFT and ATFT at time step t, you have to
compare what you were supposed to do as a TFT-strategist and what you
actually did at time t − 1, the former of which is encoded in the moves at
t−2. Given the last time step only, you would have no way to judge whether
your move was right.
Among the n = 16 states, the remaining ones are (DD,CC) and (CC,DD).
The former state is accessed when Bob does not react to Alice’s erroneous
defection, e.g., when Bob is using AllC. If that is the case, Alice as an ATFT
strategist will maintain D at (DD,CC) to gain a higher payoff than Bob on
average:
(CD,CC)→ (DD,CC)→ (DD,CC)→ . . . . (7)
Due to this property, this strategy is able to exploit AllC, satisfying the
distinguishability criterion. Now, the last state to consider is (CC,DD). It
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is reached when Bob defects at (DC,DD). Then, Alice cannot maintain her
ATFT strategy, because it would make (CC,DD) recurrent and thus violate
the defensibility criterion. For this reason, Alice must return back to TFT
at (CC,DD) by choosing D:
(CC,DD) → (CC,DD)→ (CC,DD)→ . . . : indefensible (wrong)
↓
(CD,DD). (8)
This completes the derivation of TFT-ATFT.
4. Evolutionary dynamics
Although we have been mainly concerned about the game between two
players Alice and Bob, let us consider an evolving population in this section.
The purpose is to see how our designed TFT-ATFT performs in the presence
of other strategies such as TFT and WSLS in an evolutionary framework.
Unfortunately, an investigation on the full set of strategies with m = 2 is
unfeasible due to our limited computing resources at the moment. As a
preliminary test, this section checks the performance of TFT-ATFT against
the 16 strategies with m = 1.
By adding TFT-ATFT, we have N = 17 strategies in total. The fraction
of strategy i is denoted as xi. The normalization condition gives
∑
i xi = 1.
If TFT-ATFT is successful, its fraction will be of O(1) in the long run.
In this evolutionary setting, our assumption is that every player plays the
IPD against each other for a long time to obtain an error-average payoff.
To be more specific, we will construct the payoff matrix M by choosing
MDC = b = 1, MCC = b − c = 1/2, MDD = 0, and MCD = −c = −1/2 for
our calculation. The error probability is set to be e = 10−2 in calculating
error-averaged payoffs between every pair of strategies. As in Sec. 2, let fij
denote the payoff that strategy i earns against strategy j on average. In
a well-mixed population, the expected payoff of strategy i is calculated as
fi =
∑
j fijxj . The replicator equation [42, 43, 44] then describes the time
evolution of xi in the following way:
x˙i = (1− µ)fixi − 〈f〉xi +
µ
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
fjxj , (9)
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Figure 3: Numerical integration of the replicator equation. TFT-ATFT is included in
addition to the 16 strategies with m = 1. The payoff matrix M [Eq. (1)] is given by
MDC = 1, MCC = 1/2, MDD = 0, and MCD = −1/2. For every pair of strategies, we
consider average payoffs over a long time with error probability e = 10−2. The mutation
rate is set as µ = 10−4.
where the left-hand side means the time derivative of xi and 〈f〉 ≡
∑
j fjxj =∑
ij fijxixj is the mean payoff of the population. The last term on the right-
hand side describes mutation with rate µ, which is set to be 10−4 in our
numerical calculation. The replicator equation expresses an idea that a
successful strategy, relative to the population mean, will increase its frac-
tion in a well-mixed infinite population. Equation (9) generates a trajec-
tory on the 16-dimensional space of (x0, . . . , x15), and x16 is constrained by
the normalization condition. Under the deterministic dynamics of Eq. (9),
the trajectory generally depends on the initial condition. For this reason,
we have tested various initial conditions by taking 4, 854 grid points with
xi = 1/33, 5/33, . . . , 17/33 in this 16-dimensional space. Our numerical cal-
culation shows that TFT-ATFT occupies virtually the entire population for
99.3% of the initial conditions. Figure 3 depicts one such example.
Our simulation has shown that TFT-ATFT performs well even when
many strategies compete simultaneously. One might say that the success
of TFT-ATFT is not unexpected, because it has a longer memory than any-
body else. However, a longer memory does not necessarily lead to better
performance. The polymorphic population of memory-one strategies can be
viewed as a mixed-strategy player with m = 1 from the viewpoint of TFT-
ATFT, and longer memory does not bring an advantage over a memory-one
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stochastic strategy [36]. In this respect, it is not completely trivial that
the acquisition of additional memory bits makes such a huge impact on the
ecosystem of memory-one strategies.
5. Discussion and Summary
It is well known from the notion of direct reciprocity that cooperation
can constitute an equilibrium in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. However,
when players are in conflict with each other, as we are witnessing all around
the world, we have to instead ask ourselves how to lead them back to the
cooperative equilibrium. One may introduce population dynamics such as
Eq. (9) to achieve this goal. As members of a WSLS population, for ex-
ample, Alice and Bob can keep cooperating with each other, resisting the
temptation of defection with the aid of other members. However, we do not
know whether such a population always happens to exist around the players.
Moreover, even if it does exist, population dynamics can take place over a
much longer time scale than that of individual interactions. In this work, we
have tried to propose a solution such that recovers mutual cooperation from
implementation error within a time scale of individual interactions. The so-
lution turns out to be a simple combination of TFT and ATFT. If Alice uses
this strategy against Bob, she normally uses TFT but shifts to ATFT upon
recognizing her own error. Alice begins to behave as a TFT strategist again
when mutual cooperation is restored at (CC,DC) or (DC,DC) [Eqs. (5) and
(6)], or when Bob keeps defecting after her cooperation [Eq. (8)]. It is worth
noting that Alice does not experience any security risk by announcing what
she plans to do. Predictability does not necessarily imply exploitability. The
point is that when designing a strategy, one should make use of transient
nodes, which the co-player cannot visit at will.
Knowing that Alice employs TFT-ATFT, Bob can also safely choose the
same strategy, considering that it is efficient and defensible. Having adopted
TFT-ATFT, he will find the following: The efficiency criterion means that
the average payoff fii approaches MCC as e → 0 for i =TFT-ATFT. Due
to the defensibility criterion, furthermore, the average payoff fij satisfies
fij ≥ fji against an arbitrary strategy j. By definition of the PD game,
mutual cooperation is Pareto optimal, which means that fii ≥ (fij + fji)/2.
An immediate consequence is that fii ≥ (fij + fji)/2 ≥ (fji + fji)/2 = fji.
For Bob, therefore, switching to another strategy j 6= i does not bring him
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any advantage. In other words, the strategy is the best response to itself and
thus constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the limit of e→ 0.
In addition, we remark the following three properties of TFT-ATFT:
First, the defensibility criterion holds true regardless of the complexity of
Bob’s strategy, because this criterion solely depends on the transitions al-
lowed by Alice (Fig. 2). Second, in terms of the stationary probability dis-
tribution ~v, the efficiency criterion implies that (DD,DD) has vanishingly
small probability between two TFT-ATFT players when e ≪ 1. Indeed,
players can escape from mutual defection via erroneous cooperation (Fig. 2):
(DD,DD) −−→
error
(DC,DD)→ (CC,DC)→ (CC,CC),
with a time scale of O(1/e). Third, we may relax one of our assumptions
that each player correctly perceives her or his own payoff: Suppose that Alice
sometimes miscounts her payoff, by which she erroneously perceives Bob’s
cooperation as defection. However, the discrepancy in their memories lasts
only for m time steps, after which they remember the same history. They
have a different state than (CC,CC) at this point, but we have already seen
that two TFT-ATFT players, from an arbitrary initial condition, end up
with mutual cooperation after O(1/e) time steps. We thus conclude that
cooperation based on TFT-ATFT is resilient to perception error, if it occurs
with a sufficiently longer time scale than O(1/e).
It is an interesting question if nature has already discovered TFT-ATFT,
as has been claimed in case of TFT [45, 46, 47]. It is not unreasonable,
because this strategy has such a large basin of attraction under the replicator
dynamics as shown in the previous section. Even if that is not the case, we
believe that this strategy will find its own use in applied game theory. Of
course, one should be careful at this point, because our results have been
obtained under highly ideal conditions. For example, we have assumed that
error occurs with probability e≪ 1 and that two players interact sufficiently
many times compared to O(1/e), and any of these assumptions can put
serious limitation on the applicability of the proposed strategy.
One may also think of designing more complex strategies with m > 2.
If we take, say, m = 3, we have n = 64 states and the number of possibili-
ties amounts to N = 264 ≈ 2 × 1019. It is beyond our ability to check this
larger set as we have done in this work. Still, one may attempt to mod-
ify TFT-ATFT in several directions by utilizing the extra bits of memory:
For example, the recovery path from erroneous defection may be shortened,
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and the possibility of two successive errors may also be taken into account.
Considering that TFT-ATFT mainly refers to only the co-player’s last move,
however, we believe that the modifications will have minor effects on the over-
all performance, as long as they are based on the three criteria of efficiency,
defensibility, and distinguishability.
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Appendix A. TFT as a deterministic generous ZD strategy
Following the common reformulation of the PD game in terms of donation,
let us parametrize the payoff matrix [Eq. (1)] by setting MDC = b, MCC =
b − c, MDD = 0, and MCD = −c, where b and c are the benefit and cost of
cooperation, respectively, with b > c > 0. Then, a generous ZD strategy is
represented by the following four probabilities [38]:
pCC = 1
pCD = 1− φ(χb+ c)
pDC = φ(b+ χc)
pDD = φ(1− χ)(b− c),
where pXY denotes Alice’s probability of cooperation when Alice and Bob
did X and Y , respectively, at the last time step. The parameter χ must
satisfy 0 < χ ≤ 1 to produce a feasible generous strategy. For this generous
ZD strategy to be deterministic, pDD must be either zero or one. If pDD = 1,
we would get pDC =
b+χc
(1−χ)(b−c)
> b
(1−χ)(b−c)
> b
b−c
> 1, which does not make
sense. Therefore, we conclude that pDD = φ(1−χ)(b− c) = 0, which implies
that φ = 0 or χ = 1. The former option should be discarded, however,
because it gives us a singular strategy p = (pCC , pCD, pDC , pDD) = (1, 1, 0, 0),
i.e., “always cooperate or never cooperate” [36]. The other option, χ = 1,
yields p = (1, 0, 1, 0), which is identical to TFT. Clearly, Alice and Bob then
gain equal payoffs [38].
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